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Tax Discounters
In Defence of Simple Solutions for Simple
Problems - A Reply
REUBEN HASSON
Economic conservatives make things unnecessarily dif-
ficult for themselves and for the rest of us. Minor reforms
are opposed because, we are told, the problem we are look-
ing at is part of a Bigger Problem. Sometimes the admoni-
tion is helpful; it is useful, for example, to remind someone
who wants to compensate all victims of car accidents that
she or he is selecting an arbitrarily chosen group of accident
victims. It is useful to point out to such a reformer that a
scheme to compensate all accident victims or all accident
and sickness victims makes more sense.
The difficulty with the Bigger Problem approach is that
the description of the Bigger Problem is, in many cases,
arbitrary. Thus, for Professor Belobaba, the Tax Rebate
Discounting Act is part of the wider problem of the access
of low-income groups to consumer loans. In his words:
What then, was the real cause of the tax discounting
'problem'? The below-market rate ceilings of the federal
small loans law which effectively excluded the low-
income borrower from the traditional money-lending
markets. That and not tax discounting was the 'problem'.
The suggestion, then is that the legislature should not have
dealt with the consumer tax-discounter problem until it had
dealt with the whole problem of access to consumer loans.
The difficulty with this approach is that the tax discounting
problem can be viewed as part of other problems. Thus, it
is just as plausible to argue that the tax discounting prob-
lem is as much a problem in tax administration as it is a
consumer loan problem. (That is why this debate appears in
this journal and not, say, in the Canadian Journal of Busi-
ness Law). Even if viewed as a loan problem, the holder of
the tax refund can be seen as lending money to the govern-
ment. Finally, the tax-discounting problem may be seen
as a problem in policing standard form contracts; in fact,
that is how the problem was presented in litigation before
the British Columbia Supreme Court.'
From the above, 2 it will be seen that it is just as plaus-
ible to argue that the tax discounting problem be dealt with
as part of a general reform of tax administration or that it
be dealt with as part of the general problem of policing
unfair contracts. Given this embarrassingly rich range of
options, it seems to me to make sense to deal with the tax
discounting problem as a problem in its own right.
In my view, the solution to the tax discounting is
extremely simple. Since the government has withheld too
much tax from a class of taxpayers, the government owes
those taxpayers precisely the amount of tax withheld.
That amount should be paid to the taxpayer as soon as
possible. To permit a third party to take 15 per cent of the
amount the government owes the taxpayer seems to me to
amount to an arbitrary 15 per cent deduction for no reason
that has been (or could be) advanced. Professor Belobaba
would, presumably, find it intolerable if litigants with valid
claims against third parties had to give their lawyers 15 per
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cent of the sums the lawyers recovered. Under our system,
the third party pays the claimant the entire amount owing
together with costs.3 I see no reason why the government
should be in a different position from an ordinary debtor.
It might be argued that such a reform, while fair to
taxpayers, is unfair to tax discounters, in that it would put
them out of business. There are two replies to this; there is
no constitutional right to practise a certain livelihood. Once
society has deemed that a certain profession is unproduc-
tive or harmful,' it is entitled to prohibit that particular
activity. In the second place, there is nothing to prevent
those who were previously tax discounters from operating
as ordinary moneylenders, pawnbrokers, etc.
I appreciate that it would take time to develop a more
accurate tax deduction procedure. But I think it is of critic-
al importance that this be done and be done as a matter of
urgency. 5 In the meantime the government could im-
mediately advance holders of tax refunds 85 per cent of
the money owing them and then pay them the remaining
15 per cent in, say, ten to twelve weeks.
Professor Belobaba and the
"Economic Impact Assessment"
In another part of his article, Prof. Belobaba criticizes
the federal government for not undertaking an "economic
impact assessment" of the Tax Rebate Discounting Act. I
would like to indicate my skepticism as to what an econ-
omic impact assessment would yield. If one is interested in
controlling the amount of money that tax discounters make
and assuring equity6 to holders of tax refunds, one chooses
a figure that is meant to be fair to both sides. I cannot see
how the figure ultimately chosen can help but be arbitrary,
no matter how exhaustively the problem is studied. In the
case of the Tax Rebate Discounting Act, the spokesmen for
the tax discounting industry claimed that being allowed to
keep only 15 per cent of the tax refund was outrageously
unfair to them. If consumers who sold their tax refunds
were asked their opinion, they might well conclude that
15 per cent was too high a figure for the tax discounter
to retain.7 If one is interested in fairness between tax-
refunders and tax discounters and one is addicted to market
solutions one will come up with a measure such as the Tax
Rebate Discounting Act.
It is true that spokesmen for the industry claimed that
a 30 per cent discount rate was the minimum necessary to
break even, but there is no explanation of how this figure
was arrived at. One must be a little skeptical of the indus-
try's claim that a 15 per cent maximum would drive them
out of business,8 in view of the fact that the tax-discount-
ing business seems to have remained unaffected in British
Columbia despite the passage of the Consumer Protection
Act in that Province in March 1977. Under the British
Columbia statute, as under the federal measure, the tax
discounter was required to hand back a minimum of 85
per cent.9
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One reason why the tax-discounters may have been
able to continue business as before in British Columbia is
that some (or all) of the tax-discounters might have been
operating illegally. This is suggested by the facts of a recent
case from that province. In re Hanson and Harbour Tax
Services Ltd. (No. 1),' 0 the tax-discounter was interpreting
the 85 per cent hold-back provision in the following man-
ner. Instead of withholding $150 out of $1,000 and giving
the holder of the refund $850, the defendant was making
a deduction of $400 for every $1,000 refund. The $400
was made up of $150 discount and a hold-back of $250.
By operating in this manner, the defendant had failed
" . . . on its own admission, to pay at least $25,000 due to
its customers as of February 23, 1978. A much larger
amount will now be due to its customers."' '
It will be noticed that not a single holder of a tax
refund seems to have challenged the legality of what the
defendant did and that it took the activist consumer agency
about a year to challenge the legality of the defendant's
actions. No criminal prosecution has been launched against
the defendant yet and it is in unlawful possession of more
than $25,000. The defendant, in this case, seems to have
profited from its breach of law, as many enterprises do.
How does one estimate the amount that tax-discounters
will make through breaches of the law in any "economic
impact assessment" of the law?
Although the Tax Rebate Discounting Act provides
that a tax-discounter who fails to hand back 85 per cent of
the refund is liable to pay a fine of up to $25,000, my
guess is that tax-discounters will violate the 85 per cent
hold-back provision and wait to be prosecuted. If the fines
imposed under the Combines Investigation Act for false
advertising are any guide,' " the tax-discounters have little
to fear. All they need do is to change their method of
doing business and use a "tied sale" arrangement. Under a
"tied sale" agreement,' 3 the tax-discounter will agree to
purchase the tax refund provided that the holder of the tax
refund also purchases goods and services of a certain kind
from the discounter. The goods that the discounter sells
could be watches, brooches, records, etc. These articles
could be bought for, say, $20 and sold for $100.
As a result of this arrangement, the tax-discounter
has effectively and legally outflanked the Tax Rebate
Discounting Act. Theoretically, this practice could be
enjoined under the Combines Investigation Act but this is
somewhat problematic." Even if this kind of "tied"
selling is eventually enjoined, it creates a situation where
the tax-discounter will disappear to be replaced by the
black marketeer. The tax-discounters will not easily give
up a highly profitable business. If, in order to retain this
business, they feel they have to avoid or evade statutes,
they will do so. In common with most consumer protection
statutes in this country,' s the Tax Rebate Discounting Act
will, in my opinion, prove to be of marginal importance
and effect.
Conclusion
I have serious doubts about the Tax Rebate Discount-
ing Act. In the first place, it legitimizes a business which
ought not to exist and which exists solely because the
government cannot be bothered to set up a more accurate
system for deducting taxes. Second, I fear that the Tax
Rebate Discounting Act will be evaded (as it was in British
Columbia for more than a year) or avoided by its prac-
titioners. These are my concerns about the Tax Rebate
Discounting Act. Sadly, Professor Belobaba's article does
not attempt to address these concerns. #
NOTES
1. See Hanson, Director of Trade Practices v. John's Tax Services,
unreported, March 5, 1975 (B.C.S.C.).
2. One other plausible way of describing the tax discounting
problem is as one of employment. Many of the people with tax
refunds are seasonal employees; a very sensible way of dealing
continued on page 27
Rejoinder
A Three-Point Rejoinder to Professor Hasson's "Reply"
1. A more accurate tax deduction procedure would of
course be a "simple solution" to the discounting
problem. This point was obvious to all concerned.
Unfortunately, however, the adoption, institution
and implementation of a PAYE system for Canadian
taxpayers could take years. Prof. Hasson's "simple
solution" thus had to give way to a more realistic
concern: what, if anything, should be done in the
interim? The resolution of this question, of course,
was considerably more complicated.
2. Prof. Hasson's second point that the Tax Rebate
Discounting Act would be "evaded ... or avoided"
and thus prove to be "of marginal importance and
effect" has validity but, again, is somewhat mis-
directed. My concern here was not the post-enact-
ment enforcement problem. I have written else-
where about the consequences of governmental
and judicial under-enforcement of otherwise sound
consumer protection legislation and the inevitable
relegation of these measures to a "name only"
status.* Here I was concerned that the federal
legislation was from the outset analytically
unsound. This being so, under-enforcement would
be a boon.
3. Prof. Hasson's "skepticism" about the benefits
that an economic impact analysis of the TRDA
would have yielded deserves a rejoinder. In his
view economic impact assessment is nothing more
than "choosing a figure that is meant to be fair to
both sides" and worse, doing so arbitrarily. Further-
more, he asks, "how does one estimate the amount
that tax-discounters will make through breaches of
the law in any economic impact assessment of
[that] law?" In my respectful opinion, Prof. Hasson
totally misconstrues the function of impact analysis,
economic or otherwise. An economic impact analys-
is has nothing whatsoever to do with "choosing a
figure" or estimating breach-related gains. Its only
function is to provide some measure of the street-
level impact of a proposed regulation. In the con-
text of the TRDA an economic impact analysis
might well have revealed the unintended conse-
quences of de facto prohibition. Unfortunately, no
such analysis was undertaken.
* Belobaba, "Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and
Substance in Consumer Protection," 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 327
1977).
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with tax discounting problem would be to regulate seasonal
employment in various industries.
3. I appreciate that the operation of the costs rules will mean that
sometimes a successful party has to bear some of the cost of
recovery himself. However, it is the intention of the legal
system to give the successful plaintiff full recovery plus costs.
4. See, for example, the ban on referral sales: Combines Investiga-
tion Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-23, as amended by S.C. 1974-75-
76, s. 18.
5. Prof. Belobaba mentions the possibility of adopting the PAYE
system of tax deduction currently in use in the United King-
dom and notes that this system of tax deduction results in a
more accurate calculation of the British taxpayer's tax liability.
However, the desirability of moving to the British system is
not discussed. Jo Tunnard in her pamphlet, The Trouble with
Tax (Child Poverty Action Group, May 1978) points out that
some families have suffered great hardship as a result of being
coded on emergency tax for anything up to two years. The
author recommends that a "claim for allowances" form be
available at places of work and be given by the employer to
each taxpayer starting a new job. The taxpayer would use this
form to claim all appropriate allowances and the payer would
be coded provisionally from the information on the form; see
id., p. 20.
6. Prof. Belobaba has, elsewhere, argued strongly for equity in
the field of consumer transactions; see his article, "Unfair
Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in
Consumer Protection," 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 327 (1977).
7. Prof. Belobaba complains that the tax discounting industry
was given only one day's notice to appear before the Senate
Committee. I find it disturbing that the Senate Committee
made no attempt to find out the views of those who had
sold their income tax refunds.
8. One must be a little suspicious of the attitude of groups that
are about to be regulated; one might point, for example, to
the very strong opposition of industry groups to a change
from negligence to strict liability as a test for liability for
defective products. This strong opposition is expressed despite
the fact that there is little, if any, difference between negli-
gence and strict liability.
9. Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 1977, c.6, s. 37.
10. 86 D.L.R. (3d) 365 (1976).
11. Id.,,p. 373.
12. See M.J. Trebilcock et al., A Study of Consumer Misleading
and Unfair Trade Practices, Vol. 1, Ottawa: Information
Canada (1976). The authors state: "In most cases, therefore,
the charge can be laid that the fines bear no relation to the
profits made by the accused from the illegal enterprise. Some-
times they are so low as to amount to little more than a licence
fee to continue in the prohibited conduct;" id., p. 72.
13. A tied sale might be enjoined by the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission at the behest of the Director of Investigation and
Research but this is not an easy task; for a full discussion see
Connelly, "Exclusive Dealing and Tied Selling under the
Amended Combines Investigation Act," 14 Osgoode Hall L.J.
521 (1976).
14. Id.
continued from page 24
3. Toronto Star, April 30, 1977, p. 14. See also the testimony of
W.D. Scott of Revenue Canada in Senate Committee Pro-
ceedings, supra note 2, p. 97.
4. Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, pp. 93-97.
5. Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, pp. 11, 54, 62.
See also Social Profile Survey of the Community Income Tax
Services of Alberta (unpublished, 1977).
6. Mr. James McGrath, M.P., Can. H. of C Deb., April 17, 1978,
p. 4 5 9 0 .
7. See, for example, Native People, February, 1975, and the lead
editorial entitled "Legal Robbery.1 Every major newspaper in
Canada carried similar editorials encouraging government regu-
lation. Infra note 17.
8. Consumer Protection Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c.53 as amended by
S.N.S. 1977 c.24 s.1; Credit and Loan Agreements Amendment
Act, S.A. 1976, c.11. In the spring of 1978, Bill 233 received
first reading in the Alberta legislature. The Bill would require
both disclosure and a minimum 90 per cent "hand-back."
9. British North America Act, 1867, s.91(19). In an interview on
April 3, 1977, the Honourable Sidney Handleman, then Minis-
ter of Consumer and Commercial Relations for the Province of
Ontario suggested that any provincial attempt to regulate the
discount rates "would be laughed out of court." Toronto Star,
April 3, 1977.
10. S.3(2)(o) of the Trade Practices Act, S.B.C. 1974, c.96, as
amended, and B.C. Reg. 134/75 (Order in Council 562, Feb-
ruary 6, 1975).
11. See, for example, Hanson, Director of Trade Practices v. John's
Tax Services, unreported, March 5, 1975, (B.C.S.C.).
12.
13.
Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 1977, c.6, s.37.
Income Tax Act, R.S.M. 1970, c.I-10, as amended by S.M.
1976, c.67, s.15.1. Income Tax Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.32, as
amended by R.S.S. 1976-77, c.3 2 . Income Tax Discounters
Act, S.O. 1977, c.55.
14. As the Hon. Larry Grossman, Ontario Minister of Consumer
and Commercial Relations put it, the tax discounter "will be
put virtually out of business." Globe and Mail, November 9,
1977, p. 1.
15. According to W.D. Scott of Revenue Canada, the 95 per cent
"hand-back" requirement was not working in Ontario be-
cause "the charges for the preparation of the returns [were]
being added on to the 5 per cent so that the actual discount
[was] greater than that amount." See Senate Committee
Proceedings, supra note 2, p. 86.
16. See, for example, the series in the Toronto Star, April 29-30,
1977. And see testimony of the Hon. Warren Allmand, Minis-
ter of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in Senate Committee
Proceedings, supra note 2, p. 15.
17. See, for example, the Cape Breton Post, April 9, 1978 ("Calcu-
lated on a per annum basis the astronomical interest rates
would make a seasoned gangster blush!") Toronto Star, April
30, 1977 ("No one in Canada should have to pay more than
24 per cent interest on a loan. Usury has no place in today's
society.")
18. Bill C-16, 1976 (30th Parl. 2d Sess.), given first reading Oct.
27, 1976.
19. Id., ss. 2(4) and 8(1).
20. R.S.C. 1970, c.S-11, as amended.
21. The Small Loans Act, first enacted in 1939 and revised in
1956, applies to loans up to and including $1500 and imposes
interest rate ceilings by a series of step-rates: 24 per cent per
annum for the first $300, 12 per cent for the $300 to $1000
portion of the loan and 6 per cent for the $1000 to $1500
portion. The imposition of a below-market rate ceiling effec-
tively excludes the high-risk low-income borrower from most if
not all of the traditional credit markets. See infra note 41.
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22. For a criticism of the "unwarranted credit rate charge" as an
unworkable and retrogressive measure, see Miniter, "Annual
Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law: What Was
Said," 2 Can. Bus. L.J. 364, 382-87 (1978). See also Ziegel,
"Low-Income Consumers Need Credit at Reasonable Rates,"
Toronto Star, Nov. 4, 1976.
23. Supra note 1.
24. The Hon. Warren Allmand, H. of C Deb., supra note 6,
p. 4590.
25. Mr. James McGrath, id.
26. Ss. 4-6 and Sched. I, II.
27. S. 3(1).
28. S. 3(2)
29. The Hon. Warren Allmand, H. of C. Deb., supra, note 6,
p. 4590.
30. Bill Clark, id., p. 4591.
31. The Hon. Warren Allmand, id., p. 4592.
32. Committee Report, Senate Committee Proceedings, supra
note 2, p. 7.
33. Id.
34. Supra note 31.
35. The Government's calculation of the tax discounter's rate of
return on his investment was premised on a "turn around"
period of four to six weeks. The industry's data suggested that
the average "turn around" was in excess of 12 weeks. See
Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, p. 42. Further-
more, the government's "Alberta Study" that suggested a
"loss rate" on files handled of only 2 or 3 per cent, was under-
mined by the evidence presented by the tax discounters which
showed (1) that only two of twelve Alberta firms were sur-
veyed and (2) that the survey was done in June when most of
the refunds had not yet been received from Revenue Canada.
The real "losses" arose out of files that were being held by
Revenue Canada for examination and these statistics would
not have been available until September or October. See
Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, pp. 44, 61. At
worst the data was highly suspect. At best the evidence was, as
Senator Manning noted, "completely conflicting." Id. p. 81.
36. See Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, pp. 41, 61.
The Hon. Warren Allmand suggested that his department had
"wide consultations" with the tax discounters. This certainly
was true with respect to the proposed B.D.P.A. Bill C-45,
however, in stipulating a discount rate ceiling, provided a regu-
latory approach that was fundamentally different from that of
the B.D.P.A. In its Report, the Senate Committee noted that
"no opportunity was afforded to the tax discounters to be
heard; nor was there any consultation when the Bill was
brought forward." Supra note 2, p. 7.
37. Senator Manning, Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2,
p. 81.
38. Mr. R. Thiemer, Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2,
pp. 48-56.
39. Supra note 32.
40. See, for example, the comments of Senator McIlraith, Senate
Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, p. 21. One option open
to Revenue Canada would be the adoption of the PAYE (Pay
As You Earn) system that is currently in place in the U.K.
The PAYE system of tax deduction has resulted in a more
accurate calculation of the British taxpayer's tax liability. Five
out of six PAYE files need no further revision after the end of
the tax year. For a description and evaluation of the PAYE
system see the Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's
Inland Revenue for the Year Ended March 31, 1977 (Cmnd.
7092, 1977).
41. There is almost no evidence that the imposition
of rate ceilings enables a high-risk borrower to obtain
the same quantity of credit as before the ceilings,
but at cheaper interest rates. If legislation fixes ceil-
ings above market rates it has no effect on the rate.
If ceilings are set at market rates they are likewise
redundant. If ceilings are tet below market rates, one
of two consequences is likely. The first is that credit
will simply become unavailable to the poor who,because of their low and insecure incomes, are seen
by lending institutions as being higher risks. Altern-
atively, if their need is such that they have no
choice, the poor will be driven into the illegal money
market of the loan shark where interest rates are
staggeringly high and where the baseball bat replaces
the writ of seizure.
Prices and the Poor: A Report by the National Council of
Welfare on the Low-Income Consumer in the Canadian Market-
place, 32-33 (1974). For a more extensive discussion of the
exclusionary consequences of below-market rate ceilings see
Cayne and Trebilcock, "Market Considerations in the Formula-
tion of Consumer Protection Policy," 23 U.T.L.J. 396 (1973).
See also Trebilcock and Shulman, "The Pathology of Credit
Breakdown," 22 McGill L.J. 449 (1976).
42. Cayne and Trebilcock, supra note 41, p. 414.
43. The ramifications of publicly subsidized consumer loans are
discussed in Note, "An Alternative to the UCCC: Publicly
Subsidized Consumer Loans," 4 Golden Gate L.R. 239 (1973).
44. The Hon. Warren Allmand, supra note 6, p. 4591.
45. Mr. R. Thiemer, Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2,
p. 55.
46. Senate Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, pp. 51-63.
47. As one tax discounter commented:"This piece of legislation
will make no sense at all because it purports to make regula-
tions when in effect what it does is eliminate business. It does
not make any sense at all. . . " -Mr. R. Dawson, Senate
Committee Proceedings, supra note 2, p. 63.
48. For a discussion of legislative ad hocery in the context of
consumer trade practice regulation see Belobaba, "Unfair
Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in
Consumer Protection," 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 327 (1977).
49. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation.
Chicago: U. Chic. Press, 1975, p. 24.
50. The Canadian literature in this area is growing. See, for exam-
ple, Trebilcock, Waverman and Prichard, "Markets for Regu-
lation: Implications for Performance Standards and Institution-
al Design," in Government Regulation: Issues and Alternatives
1978. Toronto: Ont. Econ. Council, 1978.
51. [I]t seems likely that the media, recognizing the
limited investments in information that most people
find it rational to make in public policy issues, are
likely to "trivialize" complex policy questions both
in terms of the identification of the nature of the
issues and in terms of the proposed prescriptions for
matters of public concern so that stories can be
"turned over" at a sufficient rate to retain the
public's attention. Such a media strategy is of course
largely a reflection of the public's own natural
enough desire to believe that all problems are solu-
able, even if this entails no more than supporting
a collective decision, manifested in laws or regula-
tory arrangement, simply telling the problem to go
away.
Trebilcock, Waverman and Prichard, supra note 50, p. 32-33.
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